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Abstract: 
This article analyses the political economy of state aid in the European Union (EU) 
using the concepts of economic patriotism and models of capitalism. State aid is 
analysed as a form of economic patriotism, which is conceived here as economic 
interventions which seek, by a number of means, to advance the perceived economic 
self-interest of particular groups and actors (firms, workforces, or sectors) defined 
according to their territorial status.  The article argues that the paradox of neo-liberal 
democracy generated by liberal international markets, overlapping economic 
governance regimes (such as the EU and the World Trade Organisation), and 
nationally delimited political mandates presents new problems for policy-makers 
attempting economic interventions like state aid. Forms of economic patriotism are 
partly shaped by national institutional and social configurations and state traditions. 
Within EU economic governance, this generates a ‘clash of capitalisms’ whereby 
liberal EU anti-trust and competition policy norms proscribe certain state aid and 
industrial policy measures favoured by some European states. As traditional industrial 
policy becomes decreasingly viable, new modes of economic patriotic interventionism 
are enacted within contemporary processes of market-making, and the re-regulatory 
activity framing European markets. The paper focuses on French state aid responses 
to the global economic crisis, noting how the retreat of neo-liberal ebullience within 
the EU provides a conducive environment for resurgent French dirigiste approaches 
to state aid, indicating that the politics of economic patriotism and state aid will 
continue to be important features of the European political economic landscape in the 
years ahead. 
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1. Introduction: Economic Patriotism, Models of Capitalism & State Aid 
 
This article explores state aid in relation to the concepts of economic patriotism and 
models of capitalism. Economic patriotism is conceived here as forms of political 
economic activity in contemporary Europe which seeks, by a number of means, to 
advance the perceived economic self-interest of particular groups and actors (firms, 
workforces, or sectors) defined according to their territorial status (see Clift and Woll 
forthcoming).
1
 The French government’s coining of the term in mid-20052 is not, in 
one sense, the point. Economic patriotism is conceived here not as a sui generis 
French phenomenon, but a broader trend within contemporary advanced economies. 
The notion is also interesting because it is related to, albeit distinct from, a much 
longer established set of practices and approaches to economic policy such as neo-
mercantilism, economic nationalism, and protectionism. It shares some common 
ground with the under-elaborated notion of ‘industrial patriotism’ introduced by Jack 
Hayward (1986: 68). Yet economic patriotism, as deployed here, is a more 
encompassing term than these similar formulations. As explained below, it is of 
broader political economic significance because it is revealing of enduring and 
                                                 
1
 The concept of Economic Patriotism, as deployed here, was developed jointly by the author and 
Cornelia Woll in the context of the Warwick/Sciences Po Paris ‘Economic Patriotism: The Limits of 
the Liberal Market’ Project which we co-organise. The project papers are under consideration for 
publication as a special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy in 2012 (vol. 19, no. 5). 
2
 Dominique de Villepin argued against a possible hostile take-over of the French company Danone by 
PepsiCo on 27 July 2005. The notion had previously been employed in France but became central to 
national and international debates in the aftermath of de Villepin’s speech. See Christophe Jakubyszyn, 
“Dominique de Villepin en appelle au " patriotisme économique," Le Monde, 29 July 2005. 
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intriguing contradictions within state/market interactions in the context of 
internationalised liberal market capitalism.  
 
Varieties of Capitalism identifies two prevailing ideal-types of capitalism, the liberal 
(LME) and the co-ordinated market economy (CME) (Hall & Soskice 2001: 1-70; see 
also Albert 1991 and Crouch & Streeck 1997). Locating this analysis of French 
experience in comparative political economic perspective, France is a particularly 
statist variant of the CME variety or model of capitalism (Levy 1999; Schmidt 2003). 
Within a related comparative political economy debate, the French economic model 
identifies France as the prime European exemplar of the ‘Developmental State’ (Woo-
Cummings 1999; Shonfield 1969; Marquand 1988), and this explains France’s long 
history of and proclivity for state aid.  Crucial to this was the French economic 
ideology of dirigisme, which denotes the French tradition of directive state 
intervention in economic activity (Kassim 1997, Schmidt 1997, Hayward, 1997), and 
within that, state aid has always been an important policy instrument of dirigisme 
(Shonfield 1969). Thus this consideration of the evolution of state aid is indicative of 
broader dynamics of change in the trajectories of contemporary capitalisms. 
 
The first section will define the concept of economic patriotism and briefly trace its 
origins to what Colin Crouch has called the paradox of globalised neo-liberal 
democracy,
3
 namely how governments pursue the political economic interests of their 
populace (in order to get re-elected) under conditions of complex economic 
interdependence which they cannot fully control. This lack of control results from the 
                                                 
3
 I owe this expression to Colin Crouch and would like to thank him for a very helpful discussion of 
these points. 
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‘institutionally incomplete’ nature of contemporary national economic governance 
regimes (Deeg & Jackson 2007). These coexist with constraining supranational 
regulatory regimes (such as the EU and WTO), and as a consequence, aspects of 
market regulation of today’s complex economic interdependence effectively lie 
outside national governmental control. The second section will set out how forms of 
economic patriotism are partly shaped by national institutional and social 
configurations, with particular reference to state traditions and intellectual traditions 
of political economic thought. This will be illustrated with reference to how corporate 
governance and company law in United Kingdom, France and Germany is shaped by 
particular political traditions which one might call neo-liberal, dirigiste, and ordo-
liberal respectively. The remainder of the article explores the particularities of French 
economic patriotism with specific emphasis on state aid. 
 
The central argument of the article is that the paradox of neo-liberal democracy 
generated by liberalised international markets, overlapping economic governance 
regimes, and nationally delimited political mandates presents new problems for 
economic policy elites. In the European context, the politics of state aid is particularly 
affected by these overlapping mandates, and the conflicting models of political 
economy which shape different economic governance regimes. Specifically, the 
political economic model underpinning EU economic governance draws on neo-
liberal conceptions of competition and markets. In broad terms, it aligns more closely 
with the LME as opposed to the CME variety of capitalism. The partiality 
characteristic of French economic patriotism, protecting national champions, is at 
odds with the neo-liberal principles underpinning the policing of the Single European 
Market and the EU competition regime.  Thus, some argue, completing the single 
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European market entails the dismantling of elements of France’s dirigiste and 
colbertist policy regime (Clift 2003, 2004; Hayward 1995; Kassim 1997). This 
explains why EU state aid politics involves a ‘clash of capitalisms’ logic (Callaghan 
and Hoepner 2005; Clift 2009; Hooghe & Marks 1999). In relation to state aid, 
particular national approaches to state/market relations (especially in CME-oriented 
economies) are threatened by LME-oriented market re-regulation by the European 
Commission. 
 
The second main claim in this article is that the response to the more challenging 
regulatory environment for traditional industrial policy in the form of state aid 
involves the development of new forms of political intervention in economic and 
corporate activity (see Levy 2006). Through these new modes of intervention (such as 
reinventing urban policy as industrial policy), prevalent in France (and elsewhere), 
economic patriotism is inscribed within contemporary processes of market-making, 
and the re-regulatory activity framing European markets. These modes of intervention 
combine neo-liberal and protectionist elements but are geared towards advancing the 
economic interests of particular territorially defined groups – at times French, at times 
European. Thirdly, the contemporary economic crisis has seen a changing political 
economic mood. The current global economic downturn and financial crisis may 
signal a sea change in political economic ideas. The recent resurgence of Keynesian 
thinking is one manifestation of this. The retreat of neo-liberal ebullience of 
institutions like the European Commission (EC) is part of a wider questioning of 
laissez faire and self-regulating markets. All this is a conducive environment for the 
resurgence of French dirigiste approaches to state aid, meaning that the politics of 
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economic patriotism in relation to state aid will have interesting policy consequences 
in the years ahead. 
 
2. Defining Economic Patriotism4 
 
The analysis presented here explores what the politics of economic patriotism tell us 
about the persistent tensions between neo-liberal market integration and national 
economic policies. This article defines economic patriotism as ‘economic choices 
which seek to discriminate in favour of particular social groups, firms, or sectors 
understood by the decision-makers as ‘insiders’ because of their territorial status’ 
(Clift & Woll 2009: 15). Economic patriotism implies that the interests of the 
homeland weigh more heavily than individual interests in the economic choices of, in 
this case, corporate and political elites. The asymmetric targeting within economic 
policy choices can be either implicit or explicit. While economic patriotism, in its 
original French usage, referred to high-profile political initiatives aimed to sway 
public opinion, it can also happen without extensive political communication. In both 
cases, it is possible to clearly identify the targeted benefactors of the policy (and 
conversely, those disadvantaged). In general terms, the study of economic patriotism 
expands the focus for the analysis beyond traditional industrial policy to incorporate a 
broader range of legislative, regulatory, discursive and other interventions to shape 
markets and their outcomes. This article has a particular focus on state aid. It explores 
how economic patriotism is inscribed within contemporary processes of market-
                                                 
4
 This section draws heavily on earlier papers co-authored with Cornelia Woll in the context of the 
‘Economic Patriotism: The Limits of the Liberal Market’ Project which we co-organise.  
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making, and more specifically in the re-regulatory activity framing state aid practices 
and their impact on the activities of firms in contemporary European markets.  
 
Economic patriotism and neo-liberalism are not necessarily incommensurable or 
necessarily incompatible. Economic patriotism contains policies that are generally 
referred to as neo-mercantilist, but is not restricted to them. ‘Economic nationalism’ 
can, under certain circumstances, refer to liberal economic policies and institutions, 
hence Helleiner’s (2002: 308) notion of ‘liberal economic nationalism’. Similarly, 
economic patriotism can co-exist with (and indeed be actively pursued within) a 
broadly neo-liberal single European market. Neo-liberal economic policies can be 
designed in favour of selective industries. As such, they can be part of economic 
patriotic regimes. These subtleties and nuances can be overlooked in discussions of 
French economic policy-making which paint in broad brush terms, assuming policy to 
be consistently dirigiste or Keynesian, failing to capture the actual twists and turns of 
French economic policy since 1945 – which, especially under the influence of Jacques 
Rueff, included some neo-liberal elements (Denord 2007). 
 
To give an example of a neo-liberal economic patriotic policy regime, the French 
‘competitive disinflation’ strategy pursued vigorously by left and right alike from the 
mid-1980s, which was the fulcrum of macroeconomic policy after 1983, was neo-
mercantilism par excellence, but also unambiguously neo-liberal. Competition 
disinflation engendered a paradigm shift of priorities in macroeconomic policy, 
relegating full employment to a distant future aspiration, and promoting tackling 
inflation to priority number one. Its rationale was to achieve lower inflation in France 
than in Germany, and hence (given pegged exchange rates) improve French 
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competitiveness vis-à-vis its European trading partners (see Lordon 1998; Blanchard 
& Muet 1993). Some scholars interpreted German macroeconomic policy in the mid 
2000s as another phase of competitive disinflation (OFCE 2006; Cafruny & Ryner 
2007). Similarly, the ‘Social VAT’ reforms undertaken in Germany, and considered 
seriously by Sarkozy, are both a neo-liberal tax shifting strategy, and a neo-
mercantilist economic strategy (reducing production costs, and hence the price of 
goods on international markets). These are examples of neo-liberal economic 
patriotism - neo-mercantilist in intent, yet liberal in character. Thus, the two are not 
mutually exclusive. Liberalisation and Europeanisation do not render neo-
mercantilism ‘irrelevant’, but change its context, entailing a shift in the balance 
between dirigisme and neo-liberalism in the pursuit of patriotic economic interest.  
 
The concept of economic patriotism, as defined here, identifies particular and 
distinctive drivers behind these policy impulses (be they protectionist or liberal), 
namely the clash between political and economic boundaries (see Clift & Woll 2009). 
Economic patriotism hinges on the profound, if not necessarily self-evident, 
contradictions between internationalising liberal market integration and spatially 
limited political mandates and processes of political governance of the economy. 
Given the overlapping network of economic regimes, politicians have to face 
Crouch’s “paradox of globalised neo-liberal democracy”: pursuing the political 
economic interests of their citizenry (in order to get re-elected) under conditions of 
complex economic, legal and regulatory interdependence where their effective control 
is significantly circumscribed. 
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The use of the term economic patriotism, as distinct from economic nationalism or 
neo-mercantilism, highlights and underlines these distinctive sources of economic 
patriotic intervention. Furthermore, unlike economic nationalism, economic 
patriotism evades methodological nationalism, and remains agnostic about the shape, 
size, and indeed nature of the unit claimed as patrie. Studying economic patriotism 
therefore allows examining the multiple ways by which political and economic actors 
seek to resolve the above political tensions, and articulate economic policy objectives 
with territorial boundaries. One possible variant is supranational patriotism, as 
exemplified by the “fortress Europe” debate (George 1996; Cafruny & Ryner 2003; 
Costa, de Maillard & Smith 2007). Thus economic patriotism can imply a transfer of 
economic objectives from the national to the regional level, such as the European 
Union (EU). This can lead to liberalisation within the EU for the sake of protection 
towards the outside, as for example in agriculture.  
 
In the European context, economic patriotic interventionism can also be transferred to 
the European level and turn into pan-European (or at least EU-wide) patriotism, 
possibly entailing economic restructuring of large European firms. French 
exclamations of economic patriotism, for example, consistently cite the need for 
French and European champions in the same phrase. The Grignon Report (2004) 
recommended ‘European neo-Colbertism’,5 re-articulating French dirigiste industrial 
policy at the European level to meet the challenges of globalisation, 
                                                 
5
 Traditions of state direction of, and intervention in, economic activity in France have a long heritage, 
traceable at least as far back as Jean-Baptiste Colbert, minister under Louis XIV between 1661 and 
1683. Colbert’s bent for state interventionism in economic affairs reached a zenith when, in 1666, he 
issued a règlement to the effect that the fabrics of Dijon and Selangey were to contain 1,408 threads (no 
more, no less), and those of Auxerre and Avalon 1, 376 (Heilbroner 1992: 24) 
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deindustrialisation and delocalisation. European-wide investment in research and 
development focused on strategic sectors was advocated to herald the emergence and 
consolidation of these ‘European champions’ (see also Roustan 2004). The European 
Commission is often chastised in French political debates for failing to embrace or 
indeed permit such European neo-Colbertism. 
 
3. Institutionally Incomplete National Governance, the EU & Economic 
Patriotism 
 
Present day economic patriotism is a response to the reconfiguration of economic 
governance and the interdependence of markets that could only fully develop as a 
consequence of increasing economic liberalization in the wake of the breakdown of 
Bretton Woods, and the re-energising of European integration in the 1980s (see Clift 
& Woll 2009). The integration of markets and the concurrent weaving together of 
regulatory frameworks put pressure on national economic intervention to comply with 
international trade agreements or European competition policy. With old-style 
industrial policy in the form of state aid increasingly frowned upon, or indeed 
proscribed, governments have had to become creative to assure traditional economic 
policy objectives with new means. The multiple policy instruments in support of 
national or regional economic actors are today more fragmented and less coherent, yet 
they remain prevalent. 
 
The novelty of modern day economic patriotism, particularly in a European context, 
has its roots in the interactions of overlapping economic jurisdictions, and their 
mismatch with political constituencies. This is integral to contemporary capitalism, 
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and the market-making and regulatory activity which inscribes it into the global 
political economy. In Europe, in many instances, the compartmentalisation of 
‘national’ and ‘EU’ levels does not make sense in political economic practice. 
Comparative capitalisms and corporate governance scholars have noted, for example, 
how national corporate governance regimes are today ‘institutionally incomplete’ 
because ‘national institutions are becoming overlain by a growing set of European and 
international institutions’ (Deeg & Jackson 2007: 155). A multi-levelled governance 
of political economic and corporate activity prevails, which spans the regional level 
(such as European regulation) and the global level (such as the World Trade 
Organisation). Economic patriotism must therefore operate within certain limits of 
supranational and global regulation. This ‘institutionally incomplete’ nature of 
national economic governance regimes exacerbates Colin Crouch’s ‘paradox of 
globalised neo-liberal democracy’.  
 
In policy domains such as industrial policy or corporate governance, national 
differences impede a harmonious or harmonised European policy response or strategy 
(Clift 2009; EC 2007). Supranational rules constrain or prevent policy mechanisms 
such as tariffs, public procurement, and favoured market access. Elements of 
traditional economic nationalist political economy and industrial policy (such as 
indiscriminate use of state aid) have been rendered unfeasible by negative integration 
built upon neoliberal political economic foundations. European competition policy 
has at times interfered to proscribe state aids and subsidies and other forms of 
industrial policy (Levy 1999; Schmidt 1996). Such EC activism repeatedly draws 
stinging criticism from national political elites and economic actors. Thus, in some 
instances, national traditions of economic intervention (discussed below) are in stark 
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contrast to the policy solutions implied by EU-level integration. This helps explain 
why boundary disputes between EC economic governance competencies and national 
‘ownership’ of economic patriotic policies or areas of regulation are increasingly 
politically charged. 
 
The framing of European economic patriotism can incorporate notions such as 
‘developmental state Europe’ (Gamble 2006), as well as the EU as ‘shield’ against 
globalisation. The ‘Lisbon Agenda’ to transform the European Economy into ‘the 
most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion … 
by 2010’ is another, more liberal variant of this European economic patriotic 
discourse. Problems arise with the disjuncture between the ‘developmental state 
Europe’ terms in which French policy elites are thinking, and the actual trajectory of 
European economic integration, and its governance. So far, EU-level activism has 
been less dirigiste in character than French policy elites would wish, although perhaps 
not as neo-liberal as the standard caricature suggests (Jabko 2006). In part as a result 
of this dissonance, ambitions for developmental state type activism find expression at 
the national level through economic patriotic discourse and deeds (see below).  
 
This dissonance has been very visible amidst the instability unleashed by the financial 
crisis, and national responses to it. This has brought the limits of European 
integration, and the tensions within liberal international economic governance into 
sharp focus. Frosty EC responses to national fiscal stimulus and bank and automobile 
industry bail-out initiatives in the wake of the current financial crisis created friction 
between national and EU policy elites. The Commission was forced to revise its 
  
 
14 
Directives on State aids, not once but twice, in November 2008 and February 2009 in 
order to manage these tensions. The state aid struggles between member states and 
European competition authorities testify to difficult times for the single European 
market, and the greater latitude for state aid conceded by the commission indicates the 
power of the economic patriotic policy reflex, especially in times of recession. A 
focus on economic patriotism facilitates analysis of the extent to which we are 
witnessing a shift within the ideational processes by which ‘the European economy’ is 
constructed as a social and political space (Rosamond 2002). The liberal market-
oriented elements enshrined in the Single European Market are, it seems, being re-
balanced by more regulated, co-ordinated capitalism, perhaps even dirigiste elements 
in the wake of the economic crisis of 2008-9. The increased use of state aid by 
national governments, and acceptance of state aid by the EC since 2008 is a reflection 
of this. 
 
4. Economic Patriotism and National Traditions of Legislative and 
Regulatory Intervention  
 
National institutional and social configurations, which one might call neo-liberal, 
dirigiste, and ordo-liberal in United Kingdom, France and Germany respectively, 
shape the discourse and policy choices of economic patriotism. This is because, as 
Matthew Watson notes, economic policy ‘reflects the body of law already in 
operation nationally’ and ‘the reproduction in law of different national approaches to 
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the task of market-making’.6 The importance of intellectual traditions in shaping 
forms of economic patriotic interventionism can be illustrated by examining how 
economic policy relates to the legal context within which it is pursued. Indeed, 
economic laws reveal the footprints of these different traditions of economic thought. 
For example, in the case of corporate governance and company law, which crucially 
shape the operation of capitalism in any given setting, distinct traditions explain stark 
differences between company law in Britain, France and Germany. In Britain, the 
liberal tradition was extremely influential on both sides of industry, leading to a 
laissez-faire approach to the company. The Manchester School of liberal economic 
thought drew on, and perhaps distorted, Lockean norms of property rights to arrive at 
a contractualist logic, and an absolutist conception of corporate property rights. In this 
conception the function of company law was to protect property rights, and no quid 
pro quo or social obligation could be expected in return for the enormous privileges of 
the licence to operate, and limited liability (Hunt 1936; Tivey 1978; Hannah 1983). 
As Gamble and Kelly put it (2000: 33-4), 
although the huge legal privilege of limited liability had been granted, the 
exponents of laissez-faire were very unwilling that anything substantial should 
be conceded in return for it, in the shape of accountability, disclosure 
provisions or particular governance structures to ensure that companies acted 
in accordance with the public interest. Having given companies a basic 
framework, the laissez-faire proponents argued, the State needed to leave them 
                                                 
6
 This discussion draws on the paper ‘Economic Patriotism and National Traditions of Economic 
Thought’, presented by Matthew Watson at the economic patriotism workshop at the University of 
Warwick, February 2008. 
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to manage their own affairs, having no desire or business to force on ‘these 
little republics’ any particular constitution.7  
 
The subsequent evolution of English company law demonstrates that laissez-
faire principles proved extremely influential in shaping the constitution of the 
company. In relation to accountability, disclosure, or internal organisation or 
constitution of the firm, no requirements were stipulated. The interests of small 
investors or the working class were not reflected in the limited liability legal 
settlement which was legislated in Britain in the middle of the 19th Century.  
In contrast to the British case, where the company is seen as primarily a private 
association, in France and Germany there was more of a notion of limited companies 
being public bodies. As such, they could be called upon to fulfil functions other than 
profit-making, which Martin Höpner studies as a form of “cross-subsidizing.” (2006) 
The market-making legal fabric of company law in these political economies reflects 
different traditions of economic thought. In France, the notion of social interest of the 
firm, l’intérêt social, has always been pervasive (see Clift 2007). As the Viénot report 
on French corporate governance notes, this intérêt social simply does not exist in 
Anglo-Saxon law, yet it plays a key role in French company law (Viénot 1995: 935); 
In Anglo-Saxon countries the emphasis is for the most part placed on the 
objective of maximising share values, whilst on the European continent 
and France in particular the emphasis is placed more on the human assets 
and resources of the company 
 
The report defines the social interest of the company as, 
                                                 
7
 The ‘little republics’ quote is from Hunt (1936: 135). 
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the greater interest of the body itself … the company considered as an 
autonomous economic agent pursuing its own ends, distinct notably from 
those of its shareholders, employees, creditors (including tax authorities), 
suppliers and customers, but which correspond to their common general 
interest, which is to ensure the prosperity of the company 
 
As if to demonstrate how far removed from the English company law 
paradigm the intérêt social can be, Alcouffe (2000: 134-5) notes that it is partially 
derived from the encyclicals of the Catholic Church, rooted in the ideas of Thomas 
Aquinas. Regarding the aim of the company, these stipulate that it  
is not merely the acquisition of profit but is the very existence of the 
company as a community of people who in their different ways search to 
satisfy their fundamental needs and who constitute a group peculiar to the 
service of the community as a whole 
 
In Germany, a constitutional approach to economic lawmaking used public authority 
to delineate the rights and obligations of private actors within firms, and thus 
“German lawmakers constitutionalized shareholder representation through public 
authority” (Jackson 2001: 132). Company law has, since the 1870s, required two-tier 
board arrangements, with a managing and a supervisory board drawn from all sides of 
the company, and extensive worker representation and consultation. This 
constitutionalist approach inscribed a conception of ‘industrial citizenship’. This 
entailed the protection of the public interest, and the building of the corporatist ethos 
establishing the rights and obligations of all social partners into the very make-up and 
institutional and governance structure of the company. This has given rise to what 
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Jackson terms Germany’s “non-liberal” corporate governance, which spans market 
regulation, financial regulation and company law (Jackson 2001). 
 
Also important in Germany is the ordo-liberal tradition of economic thought. 
Traceable back to Walter Eucken, this variegated tradition, which ‘originated in the 
agony of the Weimar Republic’ has been summarised as ‘a strong state committed to 
the restoration of a competitive economic order’ (Lehmbruch 2001: 80), which places 
emphasis on rule-bound economic policy-making. Whilst ordo-liberalism betrays 
‘considerable affinity to the statist tradition of German economics’, it involves 
‘reconciling a capitalist economic order with social reform’. Ordo-liberalism entails 
‘“market-conforming interventionism,” in particular to guarantee competition as a 
condition for economic efficiency’ (Lehmbruch 2001: 81).  
 
This forms one element of the post-war German ‘discourse of embedded capitalism,’ 
namely the ‘social market economy’ which can be summarised as ‘a pragmatic and 
eclectic combination of ordo-liberal concepts with social policy postulates of the 
Social Catholic tradition’ (Lehmbruch 2001: 84). The discourse of embedded 
capitalism combined redistributive welfare with the market economy, and a 
commitment to full employment (which ordo-liberals like Eucken were sceptical of) 
(Lehmbruch 2001: 84). Regulation of the economy was justifiable provided it could 
be argued to be ‘in conformity with the market’, and thus ‘the distinction between 
state interventions according to their degree of “market conformity” became the 
magic formula for this accommodation of the ordo-liberal creed to social policy and 
helped to reconcile it with the heritage of state-led social reform’ (Lehmbruch 2001: 
84-5). The incorporation of labour into the post-war German political economy and 
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social market economy proceeded via co-determination through corporatist collective 
bargaining institutions, and German corporate governance norms which treated 
workers as ‘industrial citizens’ with extensive rights within the firm. The fingerprints 
of these ideational influences can still be seen on the shape of German company law 
and corporate governance today, and provide the context for its particular brand of 
economic patriotism. 
 
Thus the form that the particular French brand of the broader phenomenon on 
economic patriotism discussed below takes is shaped and influenced, though not 
determined, by French state traditions of economic interventionism. 
 
5. Models of Capitalism, The European Single Market, and the Clash of 
European Capitalisms  
 
\As noted above, Varieties of Capitalism identifies LME and CMEs as the two 
prevailing ideal-types of capitalism (Hall & Soskice 2001). These map onto the 
comparative political economy distinction between ‘shareholder’ and ‘stakeholder’ 
capitalism (Kelly, Kelly & Gamble 1997). CME and LME varieties of capitalism thus 
‘provide a broader institutional context within which stakeholder and shareholder 
models of governance can be analyzed’ (Vitols 2001: 338).The ‘nexus of institutions’ 
(Cioffi 2000: 574) which constitutes a variety of capitalism, through which 
governments, state and firm actors organise and regulate corporate and economic 
activity, has a profound impact on actors’ behaviour, norms and incentive structures. 
These shape how capitalism works in any given setting.  
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Within the LME ideal-type, Hall and Soskice emphasise ‘competitive market 
arrangements’ to co-ordinate firm activities, and more specifically ‘highly competitive 
markets’ to ‘organise relations’ with firms’ ‘suppliers of finance’ (Hall & Soskice 
2001: 8-9). This is market-based firm financing, reliant on capital markets rather than 
bank- or institutionally-based processes. In CMEs, by contrast, ‘non-market’ 
interactions, institutions, relationships and ‘modes of co-ordination’ are crucial. Firms 
rely on these non-market oriented networks to ‘co-ordinate their endeavours’. Long-
termist relations with banks and other private, public or para-public financing 
institutions are characteristic CME modes of firm financing. These lead to ‘network 
monitoring based on the exchange of private information inside networks’ (Hall & 
Soskice 2001: 8). The cross-shareholdings which formerly sustained the ‘protected 
capitalism’ logic (Schmidt 1996) of France’s ‘financial network economy’ (Morin 
2000) are typical CME mechanisms. 
 
Elsewhere, I have explored in detail how this ‘clash of capitalisms’ has influenced the 
(non-)harmonisation of takeover regulation in the EU (Clift 2009). The reason why 
the apparently technical issue of takeover regulation is of great political economic 
significance is because different approaches to takeovers reflect different models of 
political economy. Takeover regulation is a battleground in the clash of capitalisms 
within European economic governance. Broadly speaking, to the extent that market 
mechanisms can operate un-impeded, the LME approach prevails. To the extent that 
states and firms are able to introduce or rely on impediments to a free market for 
corporate control, a more co-ordinated, regulated, or ‘institutional economy’ (Crouch 
& Streeck 1997) approach prevails.  
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To some extent a similar story provides the backdrop to debates about state aid within 
the European political economy. Thus the ‘clash of capitalisms’ explains the political 
economic causes of divergences between the EC and some member states over state 
aid. Here we use the French example to illustrate a broader point about the 
relationship between European economic integration and domestic economic policy in 
relation to state aid. The U.S. influenced anti-trust, anti-dirigiste bias of the neo-
liberal Single European Act (SEA) and its competition regulation, policed by the 
commission, are built on the LME model of political economy.  
 
In the case of France, this LME model blunted some of the French model’s traditional 
dirigiste policy instruments, notably state aid.  The policy mechanisms of traditional 
French dirigisme included, firstly, price, credit and exchange controls; tutelle (or 
hands-on supervision) over key (public and private) industries, involving ‘an intricate 
network of commitments on the part of private firms... all in return for favours from 
the state... [and] the habit of the exercise of power by public officials over the private 
sector of the economy’ (Shonfield 1969: 86 & 128). The final element of the 
‘economy of administered finance’ was state orchestration of industrial finance 
through the Plan. Central to France’s dirigiste interventionism was the state’s role in 
providing funds for industrial investment (Zysman 1983: 99-170). The state’s 
centrality to the institutionalised system of ‘selective allocation of credit’ from private 
and public banks gave the French state extraordinary leverage, acting as the 
gatekeeper for strategic, cheap capital (Zysman 1983: 75-8). State loans tended to be 
conditional upon meeting specific restructuring targets, incorporating subsidiaries into 
parent companies, or merging with other big firms (see Clift 2003, 2004).  
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These French dirigiste industrial policy mechanisms were at odds with the neo-
liberalism of the Single European Act, predicated upon Anglo-Saxon norms of 
capitalist organization. This was perhaps most evident in anti-trust directives, based 
on U.S. anti-trust legislation. The monopolistic, protectionist and dirigiste norms of 
the French industrial policy, particularly in the public sector, clashed with EU rules on 
unfair competition, liberalization and deregulation. Hoepner and Schafer have argued 
that European integration has entered a new phase in which it ‘systematically clashes 
with national varieties of capitalism’ but also ‘asymmetrically targets’ the institutions 
of CME stakeholder capitalism, with the result that ‘political resistance in the 
organised economies leads to a crisis of political integration’ (2007: 6). Some national 
traditions of political economic intervention are or were indeed more attached to a 
prominent role for state aid than others, and thus the SEA’s Anglo-Saxon or LME 
bias asymmetrically targets dirigiste approaches to industrial policy. The case of state 
aid thus supports Hoepner and Schafer’s thesis.  The politics of state aid in the EU 
involves a ‘clash of capitalisms’ logic (Callaghan and Hoepner 2005; Hooghe & 
Marks 1999), with defence of particular national approaches to state/market relations 
from the perceived threat of LME-oriented re-regulation on the part of state actors in 
more CME-oriented economies (for example, France, Italy, and Germany). This 
illustrates how European initiatives present opportunities to policy actors in their 
import and mediation by institutions, governments, and national politics.  
 
6. State Aid, Economic Patriotism & The French Case 
 
The economic patriotism argument predicts that, as old-style industrial policy and 
heavy-handed state intervention has gained a bad reputation, governments had to 
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become creative to assure traditional economic policy objectives with new means. 
The multiple policy instruments in support of national or regional economic actors 
continue to be a conspicuous feature of French capitalism, albeit on a more selective 
basis. This remains the case despite all the integration of markets, the weaving 
together of regulatory frameworks, and the pressure of European competition policy. 
In relation to state aid, the economic patriotism argument anticipates that its erosion 
as an economic policy tool in contemporary Europe has been overstated or 
exaggerated. The means are found to continue providing state aid, by circumventing 
or ignoring the regulatory regime. The deployment of state aid by governments 
endures, albeit not on the same scale as in earlier decades.   
 
A second theme that economic patriotism work on state aid explores is the changing 
forms of aid, altered to circumvent the impediments (described above) to old-style 
industrial policy presented by the EU regulatory environment. One important 
evolution has seen the development of urban policy – with cities now becoming the 
objects of a new form of industrial policy, and therefore modern day national 
champions. Thus, ‘as competition tightens the noose around many of the things that 
governments try to do for favoured firms and sectors, so they start to look for 
activities to support their national economies that cannot be defined as anti-
competitive practices’ (Crouch & Le Galès 2009: 3). Spending on infrastructure 
projects and bids to attract major events to cities are now crucial forms of economic 
patriotism as ‘urban policy has become for the advanced services-oriented economies 
of the early 21
st
 century what industrial policy was for much of the 20
th’ (OECD 
2008).The remainder of this article explores these economic patriotism arguments 
regarding state aid with reference to the French case.  
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The French State’s regulatory tentacles reach far and wide into the internal workings 
of French capitalism, reflecting in part the legacy of a tradition of dirigisme and 
‘Colbertist’ state interventionism noted above. In the post-war era, the French state, 
with its extensive range of holdings in a number of large French firms, as well as a 
much wider set of informal links to elites throughout France’s ‘financial network 
economy’ (Morin 1998; 2000). Through such links, by a variety of cajolery and moral 
suasion, the French state induced the emergence of a set of inter-linked relationships 
in major French firms cemented by cross-shareholdings and interlocking board 
memberships. These were known as the noyaux durs (Schmidt 1996). This generates a 
regulatory environment potentially highly conducive to economic patriotism. 
 
The reach of the French state’s tentacles into France’s corporate fabric has been 
weakened since the 1980s. The causes include privatisation, the internationalisation of 
French capitalism, and the liberal EU economic governance and competition regime 
discussed above. Nevertheless, even after 25 years of the decline of dirigisme (see 
Levy 1999), certain economic sectors remain subject to high degrees of regulation. 
Thus the potentialities of economic patriotic interventionism vary in nature and 
degree across sectors. Yet scholars of French capitalism have long noted how French 
dirigiste policies and practices – such as state aid – continue to prevail despite all the 
anti-trust and competition regulations at the EU level (Hayward 1995, Schmidt 1996). 
French adaptation to the Single European market provides another example of and 
context for a wider phenomenon within contemporary French capitalism, the capacity 
of the French state to reinvent its modes of intervention and state activism (Cohen 
1996; Wright 1997; Levy 1999, 2006, Howell 2009). 
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Within this reinvention of intervention and activism, and the restructuring of French 
capitalism to liberal-oriented EU activism, the inevitable tensions that arise between 
French dirigisme and the economic model underpinning the Single European Market 
can be partially resolved because ‘theory has changed more than practice’ 
(Guyomarch et al 1998, 176; see also Levy 1999: 21, 274-9). French public 
procurement norms also still favour French firms. High profile instances of European 
directives ordering repayment of subsidies (Renault), blocked mergers (de Havilland), 
or enforced opening of markets (Air Inter) are not necessarily representative of wider 
trends, and ‘certain nationalized industries continued to receive large infusions of 
capital while others were encouraged to merge, regardless of their anti-competitive 
effects’ (Schmidt, 1996: 176 & 230). Through the 1980s and 1990s the French state 
continued to bail out ailing firms – on a more dramatic scale than in the golden age of 
French dirigisme. Huge French firms such as Air France, Renault, PSA, Michelin all 
received sizeable support, and the Credit Lyonnais saga involved a massive state bail-
out. As Levy notes, these were not isolated aberrations; ‘state financial intervention 
was not simply a one-shot deal to ease the transition from a dirigiste to a liberal 
industrial strategy’ (1999: 279). Thus, even after liberalisation and privatisation, and 
the supposed retreat of the French state from dirigiste state aid practices, ‘state 
authorities have found themselves drawn back into the business of providing capital to 
loss-making, but strategic multinationals and to neglected SMEs’ (Levy 1999: 283). 
In the early 2000s, the French state intervened in a recapitalisation of France Télécom 
in 2002, and Alstom in 2003 (Dudouet & Grémont 2010: 101). 
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More recently, Sarkozy’s presidential programme (2007: 9) contrasted a vision of 
Europe as a liberal Trojan horse – merely facilitating the free circulation of capital 
and goods – with his own vision – of Europe engaged in protecting its citizens. A 
reflection of this agenda was Sarkozy’s attempt to downgrade the competition rules in 
the negotiations leading to the Lisbon Treaty, and his symbolic success in securing the 
removal of the headline goal of Free Competition from the Treaty’s preamble. This 
illustrates the ongoing desire to retain dirigiste elements as France seeks to mediate 
and moderate the neo-liberal character of EU economic governance. The current 
financial crisis and global economic downturn provides a conducive environment to 
redouble these efforts, as well as a contemporary illustration of the strength of the 
policy reflex to resort to state aid within the French political economy.  
 
Under Sarkozy, we have witnessed a further spate of economic patriotism and 
economic interventionism. This was illustrated with Sarkozy’s February 2009 plan de 
relance rescue package for the French economy. Part of Sarkozy’s economic relaunch 
plan was a reorganisation of the Caisse des dépôts et consignations (CDC). This large 
state-owned bank which runs, among other things, state pension funds has for decades 
invested on behalf of the state in infrastructure and development projects (EIU 2010: 
9, 12-3). The very substantial financial assets of the CDC have long been deployed 
strategically by the state, investing to buy up stakes in large French firms deemed in 
the national interest. This role was enhanced and revamped in November 2008, when 
the CDC acquired a €20bn French Sovereign Wealth Fund (FSI) to ‘support strategic 
[French] firms during the crisis’. 
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The economic relaunch plan was partly targeted at the car industry, with state aid 
seeking to prevent the delocalisation by Peugeot of French car production to Czech 
factories. Intervention in the car industry is partly explained by the place of the 
automobile industry in the French economy –– it constitutes 45.2% of exported 
production, 534 000 jobs, 2.3 % of employment, and 14.7% of private R&D (OFCE 
2009: 2). It is one of France’s key manufacturing industries, 5th in terms of value 
added, 4
th
 in terms of employment. It is also key in terms of the balance of trade. 
Nearly 1 in 2 French cars are exported, with 85% of exported French cars going to 
other EU countries. The car industry is also a key motor of private research – crucial 
in its own terms and for the positive technological externalities.  
 
Sarkozy’s ‘car pact’ had three key objectives. It sought to offer, in the short term, 
support for demand and jobs in the car industry. The second, longer-term aim was to 
form part of an industrial policy geared towards ensuring the future of a strategic hi-
technology industry. Thirdly, and related to the second, it sought to encourage the 
production of cleaner cars. The total funds dedicated to the package amounted to €9 
bn. The key element involves, at its heart, a €6.5 bn commitment to help car 
producers Renault and PSA Peugeot-Citroën (with innovation and clean technology 
R&D). This financing of large development programmes to develop cleaner cars took 
the form of cheap 5 year loans at 6% (not the 10+% market rate). It is offered in 
return for commitments on ‘doing everything possible to avoid redundancies’ and not 
closing plants whilst in receipt of the state loans. The significant increases in funding 
support, Sarkozy made abundantly clear throughout the negotiations, were conditional 
upon commitments to preserve jobs, and not to close any factories in France. He 
intimated a further conditionality that supported firms could not delocalise production 
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outside France for products to be sold on the French market. Sarkozy said; "Qu'on 
délocalise pour gagner un nouveau marché au Brésil, je le comprends parfaitement 
mais qu'on fasse fabriquer ailleurs qu'en France des voitures qu'on vend ensuite en 
France, c'est plus difficile à accepter" The EC raised its eyebrows at some of 
Sarkozy’s comments, but authorised the French scheme in February 2009. 8 
 
A further €600m was channelled through the SFI – France’s new Sovereign Wealth 
Fund – and earmarked to fund new equipment through a modernisation fund, thus 
doubling financial support for sub-contractors. These plans to help French car 
industry equipment suppliers rise to the competitive challenge of low cost producers 
and become European or global champions underpin the investment fund, jointly 
financed by the French State, Renault and PSA. Sarkozy’s pact also entails a doubling 
(to 2bn euros) of financial support channelled through the SFEF designed to boost 
consumer lending to increase car purchases. Subsequently, the pact also removed the 
‘professional tax’ on productive equipment. This built on earlier measures taken in 
December 2008 to offer refinancing to PSA and Renault, and to incentivise buying 
cleaner French cars.
9
 
 
The final element of Sarkozy’s economic re-launch worthy of note is the bank rescue 
plan. First announced in October 2008, it aimed at restoring confidence and liquidity 
into the French financial system, as well as recapitalising and restructuring some 
                                                 
8
 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/332  
9
 ‘L'Etat débloque 7,8 milliards d'euros pour le secteur automobil’ LE MONDE 
09.02.09 
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troubled banks. The EC took its time to approve the plan, initially vetoing it and 
arguing that member states cannot use state aid to allow banks to increase their 
lending books. This provoked some angry exchanges
10
 and a number of revisions 
were made before final approval was secured. Changes included allowing banks to 
issue preferred shares as collateral to government money in addition to subordinated 
debt, as well as to convert already issued debt to shares. €10.5 bn was handed out to 
six large French banks in December 2008 - Banque Populaire, BNP Paribas, Caisses 
d'Epargne, Crédit Agricole, Crédit Mutuel and Société Générale.  
 
One of the main changes to France’s top banks as a result of the rescue plan was the 
merger of Banque Populaires and Caisses d’Epargne to form BPCE. The background 
to this merger was that Natixis, one of the worst affected French banks which was 
heavily implicated in the sub prime lending markets – was a joint venture of the two 
banks, set up a few years earlier.  Caisse d’Epargne posted a loss of €2 bn due largely 
to Natixis’ exposure to toxic sub-prime liabilities. This exposure was such that the 
future viability of its parent bank was threatened. The plan involved the orchestrated 
merger of Caisses d’Epargne and Banque Populaires. The newly merged bank, 
Banque Populaire Caisse d'Epargne (BPCE), is now the second largest retail bank in 
France (EIU 2010: 13), and  Natixis forms its investment arm. The arranged marriage 
proved to be a remarkable success story, and BPCE achieved a swift turnaround and 
even returned to profit during 2009 (EIU 2010: 14).  
 
Of the €77bn raised on the markets and channelled through the new state financing 
structures, and thus backed by a state guarantee , €2 bn was used for the refinancing 
                                                 
10
 ‘Brussels blocks French bank bail-out’ Financial Times 28-Nov-2008 
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of BPCE (Massoc & Jabko 2010: 18). There was a central role for Sarkozy’s Elysee 
chief economic advisor, Pérol, who had a background in banking and is credited with 
a key role in the banking rescue plans’ elaboration. For his troubles, Sarkozy 
appointed Pérol as the new head of BPCE, the bank which emerged out of the 
enforced merger (Hardie & Howarth 2009; Massoc & Jabko 2010). Pérol took with 
him to the newly merged bank a team composed of two other close Sarkozy 
confidants. This enabled the rescue of the bank to avoid nationalisation, whilst 
ensuring the French state, or at any rate the president, would retain significant 
informal influence over bank operations without being present on its board (Massoc & 
Jabko 2010: 31).  
 
Another key restructuring event within the banking rescuer was to refinance of Dexia 
(a Franco-Belgian municipal lender)-  where the French Government injected €3bn of 
capital to shore up the institution. As with BPCE, one aspect of the bank restructuring 
was the insertion of a close Sarkozy ally to run the bank. In this case Sarkozy placed 
his ex chief advisor Pierre Mariani (EIU 2010: 7; Massoc & Jabko 2010: 27). This 
was classic ‘pantouflage’ familiar to all scholars of elitist French capitalism 
(Suleimann 1978: 226). 
 
In the spring of 2009, the state became the largest shareholder in the largest French 
bank BNP-Paribas BNP, holding 17% of non-voting shares (Massoc & Jabko 2010: 
28). Close links between Sarkozy and Michel Pébereau, the BNP president, were 
instrumental in speeding up the second tranche of state financial support. The day 
after that happened, BNP announced that it was buying the Belgian and Luxembourg 
sections of Fortis Bank. (Hardie & Howarth 2009: 1033; Massoc & Jabko 2010: 28). 
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Thus French state aid was instrumental in providing the assistance that enabled BNP-
Paribas to exploit the crisis to pursue an aggressive external expansion policy which 
made the bank the largest in the Eurozone. The fact that French banks were relatively 
less hard-hit by the crisis than many of their international competitors meant they 
were well placed to pick up M&A bargains in the form of troubled financial 
institutions. This presented a window of opportunity to give a coup de pouce to 
international champion advancement, and French state actors were keen not to waste a 
good crisis. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In recent decades, the changing nature of state market relations (and the constraints of 
European economic governance) made certain formerly favoured neo-mercantilist 
policies and industrial policy strategies decreasingly viable.  Colin Crouch’s paradox 
of neo-liberal democracy, generated by the liberal international markets, overlapping 
economic governance regimes, and nationally delimited political mandates, thus 
presents particularly vexing problems for European economic policy makers seeking 
to use state aid to support their national economic interests. The politics of state aid in 
the EU is affected by these overlapping mandates, and the conflicting models of 
political economy which shape different economic governance regimes. As a result, 
EU state aid politics involves a ‘clash of capitalisms’ logic, with defence of dirigiste 
national approaches to state/market relations from the perceived threat of LME-
oriented re-regulation by the European Commission. 
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The current global economic downturn and financial crisis may signal a sea change in 
political economic ideas. The recent resurgence of Keynesian thinking is one 
manifestation of this. The retreat of neo-liberal ebullience of institutions like the 
European Commission is part of a wider questioning of laissez faire and self-
regulating markets.  All this is a conducive environment for a resurgence of state 
economic interventionism, and indeed state aid. In this context, the European 
governments have been developing new forms of political intervention in economic 
activity, notably in response to the financial crisis, in order to protect their industrial 
patrimony. Sarkozy’s anachronistic ‘neo-liberal economic patriotism’ economic 
strategy (Clift 2008) is but one example of a wider European phenomenon. It 
combines neo-liberal and protectionist elements in pursuit of advancing the economic 
interests of particular territorially defined groups – at times French, at time European.  
The multi-level governance context in Europe, and the enduring liberal bent of the 
European Commission, makes such strategies difficult to pursue. This has been amply 
demonstrated by EC displeasure at Sarkozy’s bank rescue plan in October 2008, and 
his ‘car pact’ in January 2009. That said, economic patriotism, and state aid, will 
continue to play a significant role in the rhetoric and practice of European economic 
policy-making.  
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